Going the Extra Mile: Distant Lending and Credit Cycles
研究了美国银行对小型企业远距离贷款在金融危机前增加的现象，发现利率上升、银行竞争和管理层短视导致存款流入竞争激烈的县，进而转化为对远距离高风险县的贷款，解释了贷款质量恶化的原因。
ABSTRACT The average distance of U.S. banks from their small corporate borrowers increased before the global financial crisis, especially for banks in competitive counties. Small distant loans are harder to make, so loan quality deteriorated. Surprisingly, such lending intensified as the Fed raised interest rates from 2004. Why? We show that banks' responses to higher rates led bank deposits to shift into competitive counties. Short‐horizon bank management recycled these inflows into risky loans to distant uncompetitive counties. Thus, rate hikes, competition, and managerial short‐termism explain why inflows “burned a hole” in banks' pockets and, more generally, increased risky lending.