Secrecy and Safety
建立模型表明，企业面对侵权诉讼时采用保密和解策略，会导致产品平均安全性低于承诺公开的企业；理性消费者会因此减少需求，而公开承诺虽增加责任与研发成本，但需求不受影响。
We provide a model showing that the use of confidential settlement as a strategy for a firm facing tort litigation leads to lower average safety of products sold than would occur if the firm were committed to openness. A rational risk-neutral consumer's response in a market, wherein a firm engages in confidential settlements, may be to reduce demand. A firm committed to openness incurs higher liability and R&D costs, though product demand is not diminished. We identify conditions such that, if the cost of credible auditing (to verify openness) is low enough, a firm prefers to eschew confidentiality.