External Governance and Debt Structure
研究外部治理压力如何影响企业债务类型选择，发现产品市场竞争压力增加会减少银行借款、增加公共债务，而接管市场压力增加则相反，表明企业会内生替代治理机制。
Abstract This paper examines how external governance pressure affects the type of debt that firms issue. Consistent with a governance mechanism substitution effect, we find that an exogenous increase (decrease) in governance pressure from the product (takeover) market has a significant negative (positive) impact on the use of bank (public debt) financing over public debt (bank loan) issuance. Tests using changes in the strictness of loan covenants provide corroborative evidence. These findings are consistent with the notion that firms endogenously substitute governance mechanisms and that demand for creditor governance depends on the relative strength of alternative external governance mechanisms. Received May 18, 2016; editorial decision November 11, 2017 by Editor David Denis.