Management Influence on Investors: Evidence from Shareholder Votes on the Frequency of Say on Pay
利用股东对薪酬投票频率的投票数据，研究发现管理层的建议能使支持率提高26%，且管理层可信度低时影响力较小；三年一次投票会降低管理层问责性。
Abstract The literature on shareholder voting has mostly focused on the influence of proxy advisors on shareholder votes. We exploit a unique empirical setting enabling us to provide a direct estimate of management's influence. Analyzing shareholder votes on the frequency of future say on pay (SOP) votes, we find that a management recommendation for a particular frequency is associated with a 26 percent increase in voting support for that frequency. Additional tests suggest that the documented association is likely to capture a causal effect. Management influence varies across firms and is smaller at firms where perceived management credibility is lower. Compared to firms adopting an annual frequency, firms following management's recommendation to adopt a triennial frequency are significantly less likely to change their compensation practices in response to an adverse SOP vote, consistent with the notion that a less frequent vote results in lower management accountability.