Executive Compensation Incentives Contingent on Long-Term Accounting Performance
研究了标普500公司使用多年期会计绩效激励CEO的趋势，发现其使用和设计取决于会计与股票绩效的信号质量、股东期限、战略需求和董事会独立性，且公司并非盲目跟风。
Abstract The percentage of S&P 500 firms using multiyear accounting-based performance (MAP) incentives for CEOs increased from 16.5% in 1996 to 43.3% in 2008. The use and design of MAP incentives depend on the signal quality of accounting versus stock performance, shareholder horizons, strategic imperatives, and board independence. After the technology bubble, option expensing, and the publicity of option backdating, firms increasingly use stock-based MAP plans to replace options, resulting in changes in pay structure, but not in pay level. While firms respond to the evolving contracting environment, they consider firm characteristics and shareholder preferences and do not blindly follow the trend. Received September 20, 2013; accepted November 20, 2015 by Editor David Denis.