Corruption and Firms
利用巴西地方政府随机反腐审计的微观数据，发现反腐行动后，依赖政府关系和公共采购的行业企业数量增加，且政治关联企业受损，表明反腐产生了显著的地方经济乘数效应。
Abstract We estimate the causal real economic effects of a randomized anti-corruption crackdown on local governments in Brazil using rich micro-data on corruption and firms. After anti-corruption audits, municipalities experience an increase in the number of firms concentrated in sectors most dependent on government relationships and public procurement. Through the estimation of geographic spillovers and additional tests, we show that audits operate via both a direct detection effect as well as through indirect deterrence channels. Politically connected firms suffer after the audits. Our estimates indicate the anti-corruption program generates significant local multipliers which are consistent with the presence of a large corruption tax on government-dependent firms.