Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns
研究公司治理机制（尤其是控制权市场）如何影响企业收购的盈利性，发现反收购条款多的收购方在公告期股票异常回报更低，支持管理者帝国建设假说；竞争行业和两职分离则带来更高回报。
ABSTRACT We examine whether corporate governance mechanisms, especially the market for corporate control, affect the profitability of firm acquisitions. We find that acquirers with more antitakeover provisions experience significantly lower announcement‐period abnormal stock returns. This supports the hypothesis that managers at firms protected by more antitakeover provisions are less subject to the disciplinary power of the market for corporate control and thus are more likely to indulge in empire‐building acquisitions that destroy shareholder value. We also find that acquirers operating in more competitive industries or separating the positions of CEO and chairman of the board experience higher abnormal announcement returns.