Taxing the Rich
研究了在避税成本具有次可加性且富人能调整收入风险的情况下，不平等厌恶的社会规划者如何设计最优税收，发现顶端累进税不可行，可能引发过度冒险和累退税。
Affluent households can respond to taxation with means that are not economically viable for the\nrest of the population, such as sophisticated tax plans and international tax arbitrage. This article studies\nan economy in which an inequality-averse social planner faces agents who have access to a tax-avoidance\ntechnology with subadditive costs, and who can shape the risk profile of their income as they see fit.\nSubadditive avoidance costs imply that optimal taxation cannot be progressive at the top. This in turn\nmay trigger excessive risk-taking. When the avoidance technology consists in costly migration between\ntwo countries that compete fiscally, we show that an endogenous increase in inequality due to risk-taking\nmakes progressive taxation more fragile, which vindicates in turn risk-taking and can lead to equilibria\nwith regressive tax rates at the top, and high migrations of wealth towards the smaller country.