The Monitoring Effectiveness of Co‐opted Audit Committees
研究了审计委员会成员在CEO上任后被任命的比例（即共同选任）与财务报告质量的关系，发现共同选任比例越高，财务错报和应计利润操纵越多，表明监督效果更差。
ABSTRACT We investigate the relation between audit committee co‐option and financial reporting quality, where audit committee co‐option is measured as the proportion of audit committee members who joined the board after the appointment of the current Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Because CEOs are often actively involved in the director nomination and selection process, we expect that higher levels of audit committee co‐option will be associated with less effective monitoring, as evidenced by more financial statement misstatements and greater absolute discretionary accruals. Consistent with our expectations, we find a positive relation between audit committee co‐option and misstatements as well as between audit committee co‐option and absolute discretionary accruals. Our findings should be of interest to regulators, investors, and other stakeholders because we provide new evidence about how potential CEO influence on director nominations and audit committee appointments impacts the effectiveness of monitoring by the audit committee.