Estimating Social Preferences and Gift Exchange at Work
通过三个田野实验，研究工人对雇主的社会偏好如何影响工作努力，发现工人即使没有私人激励也会付出努力，但努力程度对雇主回报不敏感，而意外礼物虽不提高生产率却增加额外工作量。
We design three field experiments to estimate how workers' social preferences toward their employer motivates their work effort. We vary the pay rates offered to workers, the return to the employer, and employer generosity demonstrated via unexpected gifts. Workers exert effort even without private incentives, but their effort is insensitive to the return to the employer. This is consistent with “warm glow” but not pure altruism. The gifts have no effect on productivity, but engender extra work. This difference is explained partly by the finding that extra work is much more responsive to incentives than is productivity.