Constrained Discretion and Central Bank Transparency
构建并估计一个一般均衡模型，评估央行透明度的影响。有限相机抉择下短期偏离稳定通胀，福利高；若偏离持续则不确定性上升、福利下降。宣布暂时放弃稳定通胀虽增加不确定性，但降低政策不确定性并抑制通胀预期。对美国而言，提高透明度可提升福利。
We develop and estimate a general equilibrium model to assess the effects and welfare implications of central bank transparency. Monetary policy can deviate from active inflation stabilization, and agents conduct Bayesian learning about the nature of these deviations. Under constrained discretion, only short deviations occur, agents’ uncertainty about the macroeconomy remains contained, and welfare is high. However, if a deviation persists, uncertainty eventually accelerates and welfare declines. Announcing that inflation stabilization will be temporarily abandoned raises uncertainty. However, these announcements lower policy uncertainty and curb inflationary beliefs at the end of the policy. For the United States, enhancing transparency raises welfare.