Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors
研究对冲基金和其他私人投资者发起的对抗性积极主义活动，发现两者在目标公司市场反应、成功率和董事会代表权获取上相似，但对冲基金更关注盈利公司并解决现金流代理成本，而其他私人投资者改变投资策略。
ABSTRACT We examine recent confrontational activism campaigns by hedge funds and other private investors. The main parallels between the groups are a significantly positive market reaction for the target firm around the initial Schedule 13D filing date, significantly positive returns over the subsequent year, and the activist's high success rate in achieving its original objective. Further, both activists frequently gain board representation through real or threatened proxy solicitations. Two major differences are that hedge funds target more profitable firms than other activists, and hedge funds address cash flow agency costs whereas other private investors change the target's investment strategies.