An Experimental Comparison of Reliance Levels under Alternative Breach Remedies
通过实验检验理论预测：特定关系投资中，不同违约救济措施（预期损害赔偿、信赖损害赔偿、约定损害赔偿）是否导致过度投资，结果发现约定损害赔偿下无过度投资，预期损害赔偿下存在完全保险动机，信赖损害赔偿下两种动机均起作用。
Breach remedies serve an important role in protecting relationship-specific investments. Theory predicts that some common remedies protect too well and induce overinvestment because of complete insurance against potential separation, and the possibility to prevent breach by increasing the damage payment due through the investment made. In this paper we report on an experiment designed to address whether these two motives show up in practice. In line with theoretical predictions we find that overinvestment does not occur under liquidated damages. In case of expectation damages the full insurance motive indeed appears to be operative. In case of reliance damages both motives are at work, as is predicted.