The Risk‐Taking Channel of Monetary Policy: Exploring All Avenues
研究了货币政策利率如何影响银行放贷时的风险承担行为，发现低利率时银行会更多贷款给高风险借款人，且资本不足的银行风险承担更强。
Abstract The literature on the risk‐taking channel of monetary policy grew quickly, leading to scattered evidence. We examine this channel through different angles, exploring detailed information on loan origination and performance. Ex ante riskier borrowers receive more funding at the extensive margin when interest rates are lower. Ex post performance is independent of the level of interest rates at origination. Still, loans granted in periods of very low and stable interest rates show higher default rates once interest rates start to increase. Risk‐taking is stronger among banks with lower capital ratios, suggesting that this channel may be linked to managerial incentives for risk‐shifting.