Optimal dynamic matching
研究个体陆续到达的动态匹配环境，权衡等待更厚市场以提升匹配质量与减少等待成本，发现最优机制是累积不匹配对至阈值后立即按类匹配，并量化集中化带来的福利收益。
We study a dynamic matching environment where individuals arrive sequentially. There is a trade‐off between waiting for a thicker market, allowing for higher‐quality matches, and minimizing agents' waiting costs. The optimal mechanism cumulates a stock of incongruent pairs up to a threshold and matches all others in an assortative fashion instantaneously. In discretionary settings, a similar protocol ensues in equilibrium, but expected queues are inefficiently long. We quantify the welfare gain from centralization, which can be substantial, even for low waiting costs. We also evaluate welfare improvements generated by alternative priority protocols.