Debt and Bargaining Outcomes: Evidence from U.S. Hospitals
利用美国医院数据，研究发现医院债务水平越高，与保险公司谈判时获得的报销率越高，且该效应在初始议价能力弱的医院中更强，表明债务能提升企业的议价能力。
Using the healthcare industry as a novel laboratory, I study whether a firm’s use of debt enhances its bargaining power during negotiations with nonfinancial stakeholders. I find that reimbursement rates negotiated between a hospital and insurers for two homogeneous procedures are higher when the hospital has more debt. This relation is stronger among hospitals with less bargaining power relative to insurers ex ante. The evidence is consistent with the idea that debt improves a firm’s bargaining power. This paper was accepted by Renee Adams, finance.