Expectation Management in Mergers and Acquisitions
研究发现，在换股并购中，收购方会在公告前压低分析师盈利预测，以提升自身股价、降低收购成本；与收购方关系密切的分析师更可能参与其中。
Takeover bidders in stock-for-stock mergers have strong incentives to increase their own premerger stock prices to lower their acquisition costs. We find that before announcements of stock mergers, bidders manage down analyst earnings forecasts prior to earnings releases. Such expectation management benefits bidders by increasing their own stock prices and saving on acquisition costs. Additionally, analysts who have close relations with stock bidders are more likely to participate in expectation management. For identification, we use an instrumental variable analysis, a pseudo-event analysis, and a propensity score-matching approach. Our paper provides evidence on expectation management as a previously underexplored opportunistic behavior by takeover bidders. This paper was accepted by Shivaram Rajgopal, accounting.