Executive Gender Pay Gaps: The Roles of Female Risk Aversion and Board Representation
基于1996-2010年S&P 1500公司高管数据，发现女性高管薪酬低于男性，部分原因是女性更规避风险，导致其持有较低股权激励并要求更高风险溢价；同时，董事会中女性比例越高，薪酬差距越小。
Abstract Using a large sample of executives in S&P 1500 firms over 1996–2010, we document significant salary and total compensation gaps between female and male executives and explore two possible explanations for the gaps. We find support for greater female risk aversion as one contributing factor. Female executives hold significantly lower equity incentives and demand larger salary premiums for bearing a given level of compensation risk. These results suggest that females’ risk aversion contributes to the observed lower pay levels through its effect on ex ante compensation structures. We also find evidence that the lack of gender diversity on corporate boards affects the size of the gaps. In firms with a higher proportion of female directors on the board, the gaps in salary and total pay levels are lower. Together, these findings suggest that female higher risk aversion may act as a barrier to full pay convergence, despite the mitigating effect from greater gender diversity on the board.