Financial Incentives and Loan Officer Behavior: Multitasking and Allocation of Effort under an Incomplete Contract
研究非线性薪酬结构如何影响信贷员在贷款拓展、筛选和监控中的努力分配，发现面临奖金损失风险时他们会增加拓展和监控，且月末效应更显著，对资深信贷员影响更大。
We investigate the implications of providing loan officers with a nonlinear compensation structure that rewards loan volume and penalizes poor performance. Using a unique data set provided by a large international commercial bank, we examine the main activities that loan officers perform: loan prospecting, screening, and monitoring. We find that when loan officers are at risk of losing their bonuses, they increase prospecting and monitoring. We further show that loan officers adjust their behavior more toward the end of the month when bonus payments are approaching. These effects are more pronounced for loan officers with longer tenures at the bank.