Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation
分析理性投机者利用噪声交易者的正反馈策略（追涨杀跌）提前买入，可能加剧价格波动，而非稳定市场。模型解释了资产收益相关性、价格过度反应和泡沫等现象。
ABSTRACT Analyses of rational speculation usually presume that it dampens fluctuations caused by “noise” traders. This is not necessarily the case if noise traders follow positive‐feedback strategies—buy when prices rise and sell when prices fall. It may pay to jump on the bandwagon and purchase ahead of noise demand. If rational speculators' early buying triggers positive‐feedback trading, then an increase in the number of forward‐looking speculators can increase volatility about fundamentals. This model is consistent with a number of empirical observations about the correlation of asset returns, the overreaction of prices to news, price bubbles, and expectations.