THE COMBINED EFFECT OF SALARY RESTRICTIONS AND REVENUE SHARING IN SPORTS LEAGUES
构建理论模型，分析薪资上限/下限与收入分享政策组合对俱乐部利润、球员薪资和竞争平衡的影响，发现其效果取决于政策组合，且瓦尔拉斯猜想下的不变性命题不成立。
Many major sports leagues are characterized by a combination of cross‐subsidization mechanisms like revenue‐sharing arrangements and payroll restrictions. Up to now, the effects of these policy tools have only been analyzed separately. This article provides a theoretical model of a team sports league and analyzes the combined effect of salary restrictions (caps and floors) and revenue sharing. It shows that the effect on club profits, player salaries, and competitive balance crucially depends on the mix of these policy tools. Moreover, the invariance proposition does not hold even under Walrasian‐conjectures if revenue sharing is combined with a salary cap or floor.