Nonlinear Tax Incidence and Optimal Taxation in General Equilibrium
研究了非线性劳动所得税在工资内生决定的经济中的归宿，推导出任意税制改革的封闭形式效应，并发现初始次优累进税制下，一般均衡的涓滴效应可能提高对高收入增税的收益。
We study the incidence of nonlinear labor income taxes in an economy with a continuum of endogenous wages. We derive in closed form the effects of reforming nonlinearly an arbitrary tax system, by showing that this problem can be formalized as an integral equation. Our tax incidence formulas are valid both when the underlying assignment of skills to tasks is fixed or endogenous. We show qualitatively and quantitatively that contrary to conventional wisdom, if the tax system is initially suboptimal and progressive, the general‐equilibrium “trickle‐down” forces may raise the benefits of increasing the marginal tax rates on high incomes. We finally derive a parsimonious characterization of optimal taxes.