Information and Strategic Political Polarisation
构建了一个选举竞争模型，研究媒体信息揭示如何影响候选人政策立场选择，发现中等信息水平下候选人会偏离中间选民偏好，导致政治极化。
We develop a model of electoral competition in which two opportunistic candidates select their policy position and invest in quality. Policy positions are observed and, during the campaign, the press reveals some information about quality. We demonstrate that when information is imperfect, the Black-Downs median voter theorem fails to hold. For intermediate information levels, the unique equilibrium is such that candidates propose policies different from the median voter's bliss point. By contrast, convergence to the median occurs when quality is (almost) always or (almost) never revealed. We also show that a profit-maximising press may collect more information than socially optimal. © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008.