Takeovers, market monitoring, and international corporate governance
从理论和实证角度研究国际收购市场如何约束控股股东的道德风险，发现高附加值企业会策略性地在目标市场上市并稀释控制权以降低收购成本，基于1990-2003年在美国交叉上市的外国公司数据验证了该框架。
We theoretically and empirically examine the role of international takeover markets in curtailing dominant shareholder moral hazard for firms with higher value‐added from acquisitions. In equilibrium, such firms strategically list shares in the markets of their targets and voluntarily dilute dominant shareholder control through capital‐raising events to lower their expected acquisition costs. Empirical tests, using a sample of foreign firms cross‐listing on U.S. stock exchanges during 1990–2003, support the framework. We find a strong influence of post‐listing dilution of dominant shareholder control through capital‐raising events on the likelihood of acquisitions and their cost to the acquirers, in both U.S. and non‐U.S. markets.