Competitive Wages in a Match with Ordered Contracts
针对美国住院医师匹配项目（NRMP）的有序合同特征建模，发现允许企业设定多个合同并决定填充顺序时，工资会达到竞争性水平，而非之前模型中的低工资均衡。
Following the recently dismissed antitrust lawsuit against the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP), Jeremy Bulow and Jonathan Levin (2006) propose a simple matching model in which firms set impersonal salaries simultaneously before matching with workers, which leads to lower aggregate wages than any competitive outcome. I model a feature of the NRMP, ordered contracts, that allows firms to set several contracts while determining the order in which they try to fill them, which has different properties than standard models with multiple contracts. Furthermore, the low wages of Bulow and Levin are no longer an equilibrium, but competitive wages are.