Exclusive Dealing and Entry, when Buyers Compete: Comment
指出Fumagalli和Motta（2006）关于独家合同不会导致无效率排斥的结论存在分析错误；修正后，当规模经济足够大或进入者成本优势不太大时，无效率排斥仍会发生，以保护行业利润免受竞争侵蚀。
In a recent paper, Chiara Fumagalli and Massimo Motta (2006) challenge the idea that an incumbent can foreclose efficient entry in the face of scale economies by using exclusive contracts. They claim that inefficient exclusion does not arise when buyers are homogenous firms that compete downstream. However, when upstream firms can compete in two-part tariffs, their equilibrium analysis contains some errors. Fixing these errors, inefficient exclusion arises when scale economies are sufficiently large or the entrant's cost advantage is not too big. Inefficient exclusion arises to protect industry profits from competition.