Favoritism in Mutual Fund Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross‐Fund Subsidization
研究共同基金家族是否通过跨基金转移业绩来偏袒高价值基金（高费率或历史业绩好），发现这些基金以牺牲低价值基金为代价获得超额收益，部分原因在于IPO配售和反向交易。
ABSTRACT We investigate whether mutual fund families strategically transfer performance across member funds to favor those more likely to increase overall family profits. We find that “high family value” funds (i.e., high fees or high past performers) overperform at the expense of “low value” funds. Such a performance gap is above the one existing between similar funds not affiliated with the same family. Better allocations of underpriced initial public offering deals and opposite trades across member funds partly explain why high value funds overperform. Our findings highlight how the family organization prevalent in the mutual fund industry generates distortions in delegated asset management.