The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable Matchings
研究了稳定匹配理论的可检验含义，给出了当代理人偏好不可观测时匹配可理性化为稳定匹配的刻画，即一个简单的非参数稳定性检验，并分析了允许货币转移和单边最优的极值稳定匹配。
We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings. We provide a characterization of the matchings that are rationalizable as stable matchings when agents' preferences are unobserved. The characterization is a simple nonparametric test for stability, in the tradition of revealed preference tests. We also characterize the observed stable matchings when monetary transfers are allowed and the stable matchings that are best for one side of the market: extremal stable matchings. We find that the theory of extremal stable matchings is observationally equivalent to requiring that there be a unique stable matching or that the matching be consistent with unrestricted monetary transfers.