Medical Malpractice Reform and Physicians in High‐Risk Specialties
利用低风险专科医生作为同期州内对照组，通过三重差分法发现，仅非经济损害赔偿上限对高风险专科医生的人均数量有显著影响。
If medical malpractice reform affects the supply of physicians, the effects will be concentrated in specialties facing high liability exposure. Many doctors are likely to be indifferent regarding reform, because their likelihood of being sued is low. This difference can be exploited to isolate the causal effect of medical malpractice reform on the supply of doctors in high‐risk specialties, by using doctors in low‐risk specialties as a contemporaneous within‐state control group. Using this triple‐differences design to control for unobserved effects that correlate with the passage of medical malpractice reform, we show that only caps on noneconomic damages have a statistically significant effect on the per capita number of doctors and that this effect is concentrated among only those specialties that face the highest litigation exposure.