Industry Expertise, Information Leakage and the Choice of M&A Advisors
研究了并购顾问的行业专长如何影响企业选择顾问，发现专长增加被选概率，但企业因担心信息泄露给同行而避免共享顾问，且专长顾问收费更高、交易完成率更高。
Abstract This paper examines the impacts of M&A advisors’ industry expertise on firms’ choice of advisors in mergers and acquisitions. We show that an investment bank's expertise in merger parties’ industries increases its likelihood of being chosen as an advisor, especially when the acquisition is more complex, and when a firm in M&A has less information about the merger counterparty. However, due to the concerns about information leakage to industry rivals through M&A advisors, acquirers are reluctant to share advisors with rival firms in the same industry, and they are more likely to switch to new advisors if their former advisors have advisory relationship with their industry rivals. In addition, we document that advisors with more industry expertise earn higher advisory fees and increase the likelihood of deal completion.