Industry Compensation under Relocation Risk: A Firm-Level Analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
研究了欧盟排放交易体系中为防企业搬迁而提供的免费排放配额补偿，发现现行做法导致过度补偿，而高效分配可在不增加总补偿的情况下将就业损失风险降低一半以上。
When regulated firms are offered compensation to prevent them from relocating, efficiency requires that payments be distributed across firms so as to equalize marginal relocation probabilities, weighted by the damage caused by relocation. We formalize this fundamental economic logic and apply it to analyzing compensation rules proposed under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, where emission permits are allocated free of charge to carbon-intensive and trade-exposed industries. We show that this practice results in substantial overcompensation for given carbon leakage risk. Efficient permit allocation reduces the aggregate risk of job loss by more than half without increasing aggregate compensation.