An Empirical Analysis of Bargaining with Voluntary Transmission of Private Information
通过实验分析不对称信息下的讨价还价，发现允许可信信息传递时，强案原告更愿透露信息，争议率显著下降；而廉价谈话虽未被完全忽视，但未降低强案原告的争议率。
We conduct an experimental analysis of bargaining under asymmetric information, where the dispute resolution mechanism can be interpreted as either a civil trial or conventional arbitration. In our treatment, we allow for credible and costless transmission of private information. Consistent with the theory, we find that plaintiffs with strong cases tend to reveal their private information to the defendant. As a result, this group of plaintiffs experiences a significant drop in their dispute rate under the treatment. We also consider a cheap‐talk treatment under which transmitted information is not credible. When cheap talk is allowed, transmitted messages are not entirely ignored, but there is no reduction in the dispute rate for plaintiffs with strong cases.