The Even–Odd Nature of Audit Committees and Corporate Earnings Quality
运用投票理论，发现奇数成员审计委员会比偶数成员更能提升投票效率，降低财务重述概率，且成员意见分歧大、持股少、委员会规模小或管理层强势时效果更明显。
We apply voting theory to the context of audit committees and examine how the even–odd nature of audit committees is related to earnings quality. We hypothesize that an audit committee with an odd number of directors can improve the committee’s voting efficiency by better aggregating directors’ information and thus enhance the quality of committee decisions, as compared with an audit committee with an even number of directors. Supporting this implication, we find that an odd audit committee is associated with lower likelihood of financial restatements than an even audit committee, and that this relation is stronger when the committee members have more heterogeneous opinions, hold less equity ownership, are in a smaller audit committee, and face a more entrenched management.