The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation
通过实验室实验检验Moore-Repullo机制在完美信息与微小不确定性下诱导说真话的效果，发现该机制在大量案例中失败，且谎言与对交易伙伴理性的悲观信念及价值不确定性有关。
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo's subgame perfect implementation mechanism induces truth-telling, both in a setting with perfect information and in a setting where buyers and sellers face a small amount of uncertainty regarding the good's value. We find that Moore-Repullo mechanisms fail to implement truth-telling in a substantial number of cases even under perfect information about the valuation of the good. Our data further suggests that a substantial proportion of these lies are made by subjects who hold pessimistic beliefs about the rationality of their trading partners. Although the mechanism should-in theory- provide incentives for truth-telling, many buyers in fact believe that they can increase their expected monetary payoffby lying. The deviations from truth-telling become significantly more frequent and more persistentwhen agents face small amounts of uncertainty regarding the good's value. Our results thus suggest that both beliefs about irrational play and small amounts of uncertainty about valuations may constitute important reasons for the absence of Moore-Repullo mechanisms in practice.