Conflicting Transfer Pricing Incentives and the Role of Coordination
研究了美国跨国公司在所得税和关税无法通过单一转让价格同时最小化时，政府和企业层面的协调如何影响其转让定价，发现协调能改变定价行为，对企业和税务机关有启示。
Abstract Our study evaluates the role of coordination, at both the government and the firm level, on the transfer prices set by U.S. multinational corporations ( MNC s) when income taxes and duties cannot be jointly minimized with a single transfer price. We find that either the presence of a coordinated income tax and customs enforcement regime or coordination between the income tax and customs functions alters transfer prices for these firms. Our analyses have implications for both firms and taxing authorities. Specifically, our findings suggest that MNC s might decrease their aggregate tax burdens by increasing coordination within the firm or that governments might increase their aggregate revenues by improving coordinating enforcement across taxing authorities. Our study is novel in that we document, in a specific setting, how coordination influences MNC s’ tax reporting behavior.