Backscratching in Hierarchical Organizations
通过实验研究层级组织中互惠性如何促成隐性合谋，发现低能力工人更可能为代理人付出额外努力，导致代理人扭曲招聘偏向低能力者，而利润分享可缓解这种扭曲。
We experimentally investigate the role of reciprocity in sustaining the emergence of implicit collusive agreements in hierarchical organizations. We show that when an agent hires, on behalf of the principal, one worker out of two candidates: (i) low ability workers, being less entitled to be selected, are more likely to exert effort in a task that is exclusively beneficial to the agent; (ii) as a consequence, agents distort the hiring process in favor of low ability workers; and (iii) sharing a small part of the organization’s profits with the workers alleviates their effort distortion