Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues
研究了委员会在议题不确定时，如何通过投票规则决定是否将议题纳入议程，发现更保守的选择规则会使选民更保守，而决策规则效果相反，并与议程设定者和社会规划者进行了比较。
We study selection rules: voting procedures used by committees to choose whether to place an issue on their agenda.At the selection stage of the model, committee members are uncertain about their final preferences.They only have some private information about these preferences.We show that voters become more conservative when the selection rule itself becomes more conservative.The decision rule has the opposite effect.We compare these voting procedures to the designation of an agenda setter among the committee, and to a utilitarian social planner with all the ex interim private information.