Frequent Financial Reporting and Managerial Myopia
利用美国企业从年报过渡到半年报再到季报的历史数据，研究发现报告频率增加导致投资显著下降，这主要源于管理层短视行为，为是否取消季报的争议提供了证据。
ABSTRACT Using the transition of U.S. firms from annual reporting to semi-annual reporting and then to quarterly reporting over the period 1950–1970, we provide evidence on the effects of increased reporting frequency on firms' investment decisions. Estimates from difference-in-differences specifications indicate that increased reporting frequency is associated with an economically large decline in investments. Additional analyses reveal that the decline in investments is most consistent with frequent financial reporting inducing myopic management behavior. Our evidence informs the recent controversial debate about eliminating quarterly reporting for U.S. corporations. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; G30; G31.