Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form
指出，若合同双方特征部分不可观测且存在内生匹配，回归系数可能误导。利用文艺复兴早期托斯卡纳的地主-佃农合同数据，控制内生匹配后，发现佃农风险规避影响合同选择。
Empirical work on contracts typically regresses contract choice on observed principal and agent characteristics. If (i) some of these characteristics are unobserved or partially observed and (ii) there are incentives whereby particular types of agents end up contracting with particular types of principals, estimated coefficients on the observed characteristics may be misleading. We address this endogenous matching problem using a data set on agricultural contracts between landlords and tenants in early Renaissance Tuscany. Controlling for endogenous matching has an impact on parameters of interest, and tenants' risk aversion appears to have influenced contract choice.