Signaling, Free Cash Flow and “Nonmonotonic” Dividends
本文构建了一个模型，将股利同时作为信号传递和处置自由现金流的工具，发现高质量公司支付较低股利，而低质量公司支付较高股利，股利与外部信号呈非单调关系，并得到实证支持。
Abstract Many argue that dividends signal future earnings or dispose of excess cash. Empirical support is inconclusive, potentially because no model combines both rationales. This paper does. Higher quality firms pay dividends to eliminate the free cash‐flow problem, while firms that outsiders perceive as lower quality pay dividends to signal future earnings and reduce the free cash‐flow problem. In equilibrium, dividends are nonmonotonic with respect to the signal observed by outsiders; the highest quality firms pay smaller dividends than lower perceived quality firms. The model reconciles the existing literature and generates new empirical predictions that are tested and supported.