Managerial Autonomy, Allocation of Control Rights, and Optimal Capital Structure
研究了外部融资者的控制权设计如何与公司证券发行和资本结构互动，发现管理层事前偏好“软”金融债权以最大化项目选择自主权，并解释了现金、股权和债务的动态融资顺序。
We examine the design of control rights of external financiers, and how these interact with the firm's security issuance and capital structure when the firm's initial owners and managers may disagree with new investors over project choice. The first main result is an ex ante managerial preference for "soft" financial claims that maximize managerial project-choice autonomy, which is in contrast to agency theory. Second, a dynamic "pecking order" of cash, equity, and debt emerges. Additional results explain equity issuance at high prices, the drifting of leverage ratios with stock returns, cash hoarding, and debt usage without taxes, agency, or signaling. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.