Networking as a Barrier to Entry and the Competitive Supply of Venture Capital
研究了风险投资公司之间的网络关系如何阻止外部公司进入本地市场，从而增强现有公司的议价能力，并发现网络密度增加会显著减少新进入者。
ABSTRACT We examine whether strong networks among incumbent venture capitalists (VCs) in local markets help restrict entry by outside VCs, thus improving incumbents' bargaining power over entrepreneurs. More densely networked markets experience less entry, with a one‐standard deviation increase in network ties among incumbents reducing entry by approximately one‐third. Entrants with established ties to target‐market incumbents appear able to overcome this barrier to entry; in turn, incumbents react strategically to an increased threat of entry by freezing out any incumbents who facilitate entry into their market. Incumbents appear to benefit from reduced entry by paying lower prices for their deals.