Optimal Contracting with Endogenous Project Mission
研究了组织如何通过选择项目使命来吸引、激励和筛选员工，发现使命选择取决于契约环境，在努力不可契约时更偏向员工偏好，在员工驱动力未知时则相反，并可通过评分拍卖实施契约菜单。
Abstract Empirical evidence suggests that workers care about the mission of their job, in addition to their wage. This paper studies how organizations can choose a mission to attract, incentivize, and screen their workers. We analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent for the development of a project and can influence the agent’s marginal return of effort through the choice of project mission. The principal’s and the agents’ mission preferences are misaligned and the agents vary in the intensity of their mission drive. Our main results highlight that how far the organization chooses to move from its preferred mission depends on the contractual environment in which it operates. Missions will be more agent-preferred in environments in which effort is noncontractible. In environments in which agents’ drive is unknown, missions will be less agent-preferred and the organization will find it optimal to offer contract menus that may be implemented via scoring auctions when there are competing agents. Our analysis applies to the design and allocation of aid contracts, research funding, and creative jobs.