Competition and Ownership Structure of Closely Held Firms
利用18个欧洲国家大量紧密持股公司数据，研究发现产品市场竞争越激烈，内部人持股越低，外部股东持股越分散，竞争通过改变所有权结构缓解股东激励冲突，提升企业绩效和经济效率。
We study how product market competition affects firms’ ownership structures using a large sample of closely held firms in eighteen European countries. We show that firms operating in more competitive environments have lower inside ownership and that the stakes of their outside shareholders are more dispersed. These results are explained by competition increasing the need to raise external equity and reducing private control benefits. Our findings suggest that, by changing corporate ownership structure, competition mitigates incentive misalignment among shareholders, leading to better firm performance and gains in economic efficiency.