Marry for What? Caste and Mate Selection in Modern India
分析了对种姓这类非经济特征的偏好如何影响婚姻匹配的均衡模式，利用印度中产阶级包办婚姻的独特数据，发现只有强烈的内婚偏好，且种姓对非种姓属性的匹配模式影响甚微。
This paper analyzes how preferences for a noneconomic characteristic (e.g., caste) can affect equilibrium patterns of matching, and empirically evaluates this in the context of middle-class Indian arranged marriages. We show theoretically how the equilibrium consequences of caste depend on whether preferences are towards one's own group or for “marrying up.” We then estimate actual preferences for caste and other attributes using a unique dataset of individuals who placed matrimonial advertisements and find only a strong preference for in-caste marriage. This translates, in equilibrium, in caste doing little to alter the matching patterns on non-caste attributes.