CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DYNAMICS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
研究发现，董事会独立性高、机构持股多的公司，财务杠杆水平更高且向股东目标杠杆调整更快；而管理层激励薪酬则抑制债务使用和调整，符合管理层防御效应。
Abstract Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that both a higher level of financial leverage and a faster speed of adjustment of leverage toward the shareholders' desired level are associated with better corporate governance quality as defined by a more independent board featuring CEO–chairman separation and greater presence of outside directors, coupled with larger institutional shareholding. In contrast, managerial incentive compensation on average discourages use of debt or adjustments toward the shareholders' desired level, consistent with its entrenchment effect. The effect of corporate governance on leverage adjustments is most pronounced when initial leverage is between the manager's desired level and the shareholders' desired level where the interests of managers and shareholders conflict.