Netting of Capacity in Interconnector Auctions
研究了欧洲电力互联容量拍卖中，通过净额结算机制提高容量利用率、减少拍卖方保留容量激励的方法，对电力市场设计和竞争政策有参考价值。
Scarce interconnector capacities are a severe obstacle to transregional competition and a unified market for electricity in the European Union. However, physically the interconnectors are rarely used up to capacity. This is due to the fact that the current allocation schemes make only limited use of the fact that currents in opposing directions cancel out. We propose a “netting” auction mechanism which makes use of this and in which even small transmission capacities can generate large competitive pressure in adjacent markets. Netting increases the usage of capacity and reduces the auctioneer’s incentive to withhold capacity from the auction.