Competition for Listings
构建了一个两家交易所竞争IPO上市地的模型，分析它们如何通过设定上市费和交易成本来吸引不同企业，并发现竞争未必带来社会福利最优的交易规则。
We develop a model in which two profit maximizing exchanges compete for IPO listings. They choose the listing fees paid by entrepreneurs wishing to go public and control the trading costs incurred by investors. All entrepreneurs prefer lower costs, however entrepreneurs differ in how they value a decrease in trading costs. Hence, in equilibrium, competing exchanges obtain positive expected profits by offering different execution costs and different listing fees. As a result, firms that list on different exchanges have different characteristics. The model has testable implications for the cross-sectional characteristics of IPOs on different quality exchanges and the relationship between the level of trading costs and listing fees. We also find that competition does not guarantee that exchanges choose welfare maximizing trading rules.