The Cost of Duplicative Regulation: Evidence From Risk Retention Groups
研究比较了风险自留集团与标准保险公司在商业责任保险领域的差异，发现多州重复监管显著增加合规成本，降低技术效率，抑制企业跨州经营并推高保险价格。
Abstract A vast majority of insurers are regulated by each state in which they conduct business; however, a small subset of specialized firms, risk retention groups (RRGs), are largely exempt from most aspects of duplicative regulation no matter how many states they operate. This article analyzes the differences between RRGs and standard insurers specializing in commercial liability insurance to determine the cost of duplicative regulation. The costs associated with multi‐state regulation are significantly higher than those for single‐entity regulation. These high regulatory compliance costs reduce the technical efficiency of firms, deter firms from operating in additional states, and increase the price of insurance.