Accounting Policy Disclosures and Analysts' Forecasts
基于跨国样本，研究年报中会计政策披露程度是否影响分析师盈余预测的分散度和误差，发现披露越多，预测越准确、分歧越小，且这种作用独立于其他年报披露。
Abstract Using an international sample, I investigate whether the extent of firms' disclosure of their accounting policies in the annual report is associated with properties of analysts' earnings forecasts. Controlling for firm‐ and country‐level variables, I find that the level of accounting policy disclosure is significantly negatively related to forecast dispersion and forecast error. In particular, I find that accounting policy disclosures are incrementally useful to analysts over and above all other annual report disclosures. These findings suggest that accounting policy disclosures reduce uncertainty about forecasted earnings. I find univariate but not multivariate support for the hypothesis that accounting policy disclosures are especially helpful to analysts in environments where firms can choose among a larger set of accounting methods.